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Man’s view is always reduced to man’s mind. 
For this is the part of himself he values most. THE MIND.
intellect and its powers.
narrator above all to renew his mind and exercise power 
through his intellect.
and feel,’ his task, he believes, is to ease the passage of the story 
from mind to mind
—
What is the role of museums in
sphere? Committed to the centrality of rhetoric in deliberative 
democracy, Alan Gross has extend
museum exhibits.
wartime atrocities foregrounds a notion of learning that is often 
tacitly articulated in the acts of remembrance.
George Yudice write, “Histori
contemporary moment, but in reaction to the past. [...] The past’s 
commemoration in museum form is rendered as a strictly delimited 
ethical zone, a space that divides worthy and unworthy conduct.”
(Miller and Yudice, 2002, 14
museum sites thus raises questions concerning its moral dimension 
in relation to civic virtue and responsible citizenship.
can museum exhibits animate discourses, make political and 
cultural norms visible, and problematize the ways in which we 
conduct our lives?
“consciousness raising,” to borrow Habermas’s phrase, so tha
will not repeat history?
exhibits with a more or less explicit moral agenda, framed by a 
vision of social progress?
museums have a critical role to play in the shaping of 
memory, what is the underlying critique on which this assumption 
                                         
1Toby Bennett traces the emergence of






 Storytelling allows the ‘civilized’ 
 Even through the motto reads ‘Think, act, 
. 
Trinh T. Minh-ha 
 shaping and reshaping the public 
ed his work to the studies of 
 In particular, his work on exhibits involving 
  As Toby Miller 
cal citizenship emerges in the 
8).  The pedagogical role of the modern 
1 In what ways 
 Are museums to be construed as venues for 
 And if so, does that entail vesting museum 
 Differently put, if one assumes that 
public 
           
 museums as aimed at the 






Mariko Izumi 2 Poroi 10,2 (December 2014)  
is based, and is such a critical role best understood in moral, or 
moralistic, terms? It is in the context of these questions that the 
work of Alan Gross assumes its significance and urgency for a 
contemporary readership concerned with the meaning-sponsoring 
powers of museums and the ways in which they negotiate temporal 
and moral aspects of civic self-understanding.  
What makes Gross’s writings instructive is that they provide us 
with a theoretical idiom whose critical terms invite us to re-imagine 
the societal significance of museums in the 21st century. At the same 
time, this call for a new vision of museums as sites for civic self-
reflection is not free of internal tension. In the following, I wish to 
explicate how destabilization plays an important yet ambivalent 
role in Gross’s critique of historical exhibits. Next, I discuss how 
this notion is at odds with his conception of museum exhibit as a 
form of public address, and then elaborate on the idea of museum 
as new “epic theatre” by using a recently opened exhibit at the 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museums for illustration.  
Against Monumentalization of Public Memory   
Gross’s work on historical exhibits invites us to think of museums 
as double gateways which open new futures (new social visions) for 
us by facilitating engagement with our (im/moral) past. He writes, 
“We can see them [historical museum visits] as activities that 
encourage a reflective confrontation with existing knowledge and 
values. […] The museum experience enacts a democratic 
philosophy of public education, one in which a reflective 
confrontation with a nation’s past can affect public policy” (Gross, 
2002, 476).  Gross considers the Enola Gay exhibit planned by the 
Smithsonian Institute a missed opportunity to “locat[e] the struggle 
for the meaning of Hiroshima where it belonged […] within the 
consciousness and conscience of every American” (Gross, 2002, 
484).  He believes in creating the “presence” of the historical past in 
our contemporary lives so as to keep contemporary public life open 
for change. Drawing on Pierre Nora, his treatment of Hiroshima as 
“American ‘lieux de memoire’” and the Holocaust as “an 
unmasterable past” shows how his understanding of public memory 
as something in constant flux, without stabilization (Gross, 2002, 
467; Gross, 2006, 310). It is, to continue borrowing Nora’s account, 
“an endless recycling of meaning”, which does not end with “true” 
memory (Nora, 1989, 8).  
For this reason, Gross also criticizes the Vienna 1938 exhibit in 
Austria, as a failure to generate public debate over “minimizing the 
Holocaust as a living presence in Austrian life” (Gross, 2005, 7). 
From Gross’s perspective, such failure is a missed opportunity to 
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“achieve the true balance between remembering and forgetting […] 
[and] confidently create a viable democratic future out of a barbaric 
and totalitarian past” (Gross, 2005, 311.) Through these critiques, it 
becomes clear that Gross is opposed to monumentalizing historical 
events, i.e., he sees the closure of public discourse as tantamount to 
a spurious stabilization of public memory. As James Young writes, 
“The traditional aim of war monuments has been to valorize the 
suffering in such a way as to justify, even redeem, it historically,” 
and “once we assign monumental form to memory, we have to 
some degree divested ourselves of the obligation to remember” 
(Young, 2000, 95, 94).  
For Gross, then, museums should be provocative, promoting 
public debates and “serious citizen reflection” (Gross, 2002, 476). 
Drawing on the legacy of John Dewey, he expands on the 
Smithsonian Institute’s failure to effectively open the Enola Gay 
exhibit to the public, as follows:  
The democratic hope lies, not in the suppression of 
either of these [competing] views [on atomic bombs], 
but in the creation of public spaces hospitable to both 
and, equally, to their critique: such public spaces will, in 
Mark Osiel's words, create ‘public memory publicly’ 
(Gross, 2002, 484).  
By insisting on public participation in the making of history and 
memory, his main objective is neither reconciliation nor resolution 
of competing views. In other words, he is not advocating stability by 
way of settling historical viewpoints and interpretations. Rather, he 
focuses on destabilizing our moral perceptions resulting from the 
encounter with a particular museum exhibit. Over and against the 
typical misconception that museums are in the business of 
presenting fixed and stable sets of data, Gross considers museums 
as a site of “selective narrativization” that ought to challenge the 
common conception that, “like a play, the war is over; its 
consequences can haunt only the neurotic” (Gross, 2002, 470, 473).  
However, this notion of “reflective confrontation,” which lies at 
the heart of Gross’s account, is not altogether clear. Specifically, 
Gross’s overall proposal to envision museum sites as catalysts for 
moral education does not immediately reveal just how open-ended 
this process of challenging the individual and social structure of 
moral perceptions is supposed to be. When Gross speaks of the 
Vienna 1938 exhibit as a “missed opportunity” for generating public 
discussions and confronting the nation’s complicity in the Nazi 
atrocities, what might be the standard for reflection that would 
allows us to distinguish some ways of opening out the past as 
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morally superior to others? Gross’s critical intervention in the 
unfolding debate over the interactive nature of museum as praxis 
seems guided by the hope that some better future will grow out of a 
better understood past. But, then, how does a didactic of 
destabilization go together with the kind of informed decision-
making associated with more responsible forms of public policy? In 
other words, what are the implicit criteria (universal, procedural, or 
pragmatist?) for gauging the “true balance between remembering 
and forgetting”?2  
Managing the Future 
Gross’s critiques are structured around a certain ambivalence, as 
they oscillate between favoring exhibits primarily aimed at 
provocation, on the one hand, and favoring exhibits aimed at moral 
guidance within political debate, on the other. This tension between 
provocation and guidance is grounded in his traditional 
understanding of the museum exhibit – the assembly of artifacts, 
images, and texts -- as a “text” broadly conceived, namely, as an 
arrangement of material objects (including, but not limited to 
verbal items) whose deliberate composition is meant to convey 
certain moral messages or evaluative judgments that the viewer is 
supposed to “read off” the exhibit as a whole.3  That is to say, his 
treatment of museum exhibits as a form of public address creates 
an internal tension in the process of “creat[ing] public memory 
publicly.” It seems that Gross wants meaning-formation in the 
public sphere to be open-ended, but not too open-ended.  
By foregrounding the role of the visitors as constitutive part of 
any museum experience, Gross radically opens up historical 
exhibits as rhetorical texts, and in doing so he complicates the 
notion of the museums’ textuality.  As a “diffuse” text, a historical 
                                                    
2 Here Gross’s formulations tend to gloss the normative standards for 
judging when such balance is achieved. While his previously mentioned 
nod to John Dewey in the essay on Enola Gay exhibit remains suggestive, 
it is worth noting that Dewey’s pragmatist approach, too, has been 
questioned regarding the political import and feasibility of his theoretical 
considerations. As astute commentators like Giles Gunn have argued. 
Dewey may well be able to answer this criticism about unspecified 
normative standards needed for public policy making, and so may Gross. 
But then, these criteria ought to be made explicit (Gunn, 2013). 
3 For one of the most frequent references among cultural theorists, 
rhetoricians, and social critics for this understanding of material 
arrangements as a “text” intended for a public audience. Barthes 
comments on “material which as already been worked on so as to make it 
suitable for communication” (Barthes, 1972, 110 ff., italics in the original). 
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exhibit becomes fluid and flexible, subject to restructuring and 
dependent on the social interconnectivity the viewers bring to the 
site in making sense of their contemporary lives and their 
historicity (Brummett 1994.)  Here his insistence on “creation of 
public spaces hospitable to both [competing viewpoints on history] 
and, equally, to their critique” clearly shows that Gross does not 
wish to prescribe what the visitors ought to think or learn, for 
example, about the atomic bomb in Hiroshima. However, the 
underlying vision of social progress instills a kind of moral 
chronology, that (re)stabilizes the textuality of museum exhibits. 
That is to say, the more directly museums are put in the service of 
fostering moral progress for learning the mistakes of the past and 
not repeating the failure in proper learning from the history, the 
more pressure is generated to integrate contesting views about past 
atrocities. In this regard, treating a museum exhibit as a conduit for 
“selective narrativization” tends to restore stability within its 
textuality. Such view of the role of museums implies a sense of 
coherence by way of giving more control to the curators, who are 
expected to ensure that the exhibit under consideration does not 
generate too many rival interpretations / perspectives, which would 
put the agenda of fostering moral maturation at risk. As a case in 
point, Gross criticizes the curators at the Smithsonian Institute for 
underplaying their role as public educators (Gross, 2002, 476.) He 
criticizes them for their “failure of concern” about the “opinions of 
potential visitors as a part of the planning process,” for having “no 
more than a gesture of the evaluation of exhibition as a vehicle of 
democratic public education, and neglect[ing] […] the actual 
behavior of museum visitors” (Gross, 2002, 484).  
This criticism of failed adaptation to a prospective audience 
seems to suggest that the communicative transaction at stake here 
is an intricate dynamics of careful encoding apt to provoke diverse 
decoding.  While Gross’s diction leaves some room for varied 
interpretation, he seems to endorse diversity more on the side of 
the recipients (i.e. the exhibit-viewers) than on the side of the 
organizers (i.e. the museum curators). In this regard, Gross seems 
to construe museum exhibits as a form of public address. The 
museum-goers are “provoked” into multiple responses, yet the 
range of these diverse reactions seems to be inscribed, ahead of 
time, within certain moral limits set by the implicit story line laid 
out by the curators. It seems, then, that Gross assigns to curators 
the role of public intellectuals “behind the scenes,” who are 
delivering a moral message encoded in the exhibit at hand – a 
message that is not monolithic or dogmatic, yet clearly limited in its 
moral compass. The provocative dynamics of museums is therefore 
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off-set by his insistence on responsible “narrativization” in the 
service of fostering democratic culture. In this sense, the imperative 
of historical learning (i.e., the obligation to learn from history) 
Gross embraces turns out to be narrower than initially apparent. 
Furthermore, as Peter Thompson explains, narratives often aim 
to downplay the contingency factor in history, and give us a sense of 
control and manageability. He discusses how our future visions (of 
a better society, etc.) are so many attempts to control history and 
stabilize our moral universe, as we keep trying to bleach any hint at 
unpredictability from our moral identities.  As Thompson puts it:  
We force ourselves to impose the pattern which emerged 
out of contingency onto the future and believe that we 
have discovered a means of predicting and thus creating 
it on the basis of our retrospective teleology. We then 
call that model utopia (in the programmatic sense) when 
it actually just reifies a coincidence of past and current 
events into a dogmatically determined future in which 
what was process becomes program and is then 
projected forward in necessitarian fashion (Thompson 
and Zizek, 2013, 97). 
If we apply Thompson’s remarks to Gross’s discussion, 
destabilizing our historical self-understanding is guided by tacit 
assumptions as to how the viewer’s moral values should be 
challenged and restructured.  For instance, forgetting does not 
seem to be an option for Gross.  As he criticizes the aforementioned 
Vienna 1938 exhibit’s failure to generate public debates, a non-
response is seen as a sign of complicity with the stability of existing 
knowledge and values (e.g. national ideology.  The exhibit thereby 
risks a form of “commemorat[ing] in advance,” that is, presentating 
past about “historical guilt” seem to be foregone conclusions to the 
point where the viewers no longer feel the need to actively 
deliberate about the meaning of historical events, such as the 
Holocaust and Hiroshima (Nora, cited in Gross, 2002, 467).  Such 
neglect in historical learning will fail to “make [the] connection 
between us and the dead” and lead to forgetfulness about the 
lessons from past atrocities (Gross, 2002, 469).  
This prevention by (re)cognition approach toward remembrance 
places a high degree of confidence in our ability to manage 
memory, i.e., to anticipate and control the moral response patterns 
by museum visitors to the respective exhibit. Mario Di Paolantonio 
argues that the relation between learning and forgetting is not one 
of simple contrast, such that historical self-transparency can 
directly be correlated with pedagogical success. Instead, we should 
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become more sensitive and open to the “possibility of learning from 
memory’s failures and lapses rather [sic] through prescriptions of 
how memory should be utilized” (Di Paolantonio, 2010). 
Emphasizing forgetting helps us question the extent to which the 
requirement that we get full clarity about our moral origins in order 
to take responsible action now (for a better future) may be 
misguided.  
Museum As Epic Theatre   
If we continue seeing museums as a site of historical learning, as 
Gross passionately advocates, how might we re-envision the 
experience of “learning” to negotiate the perceived tension in 
Gross’s account? Bertolt Brecht’s idea of “epic theatre,” I propose, 
offers a novel way for us to elaborate on the critical language of 
destabilization and stabilization offered by Gross. Terry Eagleton 
succinctly captures the nature of the “epic theatre” as follows:  
The task of theatre is not to ‘reflect’ a fixed reality, but to 
demonstrate how character and action are historically 
produced, and so how they could have been, and still can 
be, different. The play itself, therefore, become a model 
of that process of production; it is less a reflection of, 
than a reflection on, social reality. Instead of appearing 
as a seamless whole, which suggests that its entire action 
is inexorably determined from the outset the play 
presents itself as discontinuous, open-ended, internally 
contradictory, encouraging in the audience a ‘complex 
seeing’ which is alert to several conflicting possibilities a 
any particular point (Eagleton, 1989, 60).   
As a venue for unsettling a society’s customary self-perceptions 
(including its unspoken taboos, “open secrets” about stigmatized 
groups, codes of honor, and ranking of values – e.g. personal 
independence over social security), the task of “epic theatre” is to 
shake the political out of the apolitical, as it were. Such theatrical 
experimentation seeks to create an atmosphere of (uncomfortable) 
surprise effects, in which we may detect political tendencies in 
seemingly apolitical contexts or behaviors.  
This idea of “epic theatre” shifts our primary critical emphasis 
on stabilizing moral vision back onto the side of destabilizing moral 
sensibilities. From this perspective, we can see the items on display 
in museums as functioning like the actors’ “out-of-character” 
performances on stage in Brecht’s “epic theatre.”  This approach 
allows us to take a step toward re-envisioning historical pedagogy 
in terms of creative experimentation rather than responsible 
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decoding. Such theater-based analysis puts a different spin on the 
notion of “managing memory,” in that the role of the exhibit-viewer 
moves from reader to co-producer of meaning. I will briefly explore 
this possibility of learning through experimentation by looking at 
the recently opened exhibit entitled “Complicity and 
Collaboration” at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 
in Washington D.C. 
At first glance, “Complicity and Collaboration” differs greatly 
from the USHMM’s permanent exhibit as it does from numerous 
traditional historical exhibits. Rather than telling a story through a 
selection of images, artifacts, and descriptive texts, this exhibit is an 
assembly of questions that accompany visual scenes from Germany 
and the occupied territories under Nazism. For instance, there is a 
seemingly mundane photograph showing a crowd of women. From 
a panel beside it, one learns that this scene belongs to an auction, 
where furniture and other belongings confiscated from Jewish 
homes are sold. Such confiscations happened openly, and the 
buyers knew where these materials came. The exhibit asks the 
viewer whether these people are complicit in the reigning Nazi 
ideology and its ultimate direction toward the Holocaust.  
What is more, the exhibit itself does not provide or anticipate 
answers to any of these questions nor does it try to stir one’s 
judgment into one direction or the other. Wondering about one’s 
own hypothetical role in such a scheme, and thus moving from one 
scene to the next, it is quite difficult for the spectator to develop a 
stable judgment or confidence in his/her moral discernment. 
Provisional answers that might have been formed vis-à-vis the 
aforementioned auction photograph may undergo sudden change 
upon encountering the image of a 15-year old German girl by the 
public swimming pool, with the sign “No Jews.” In its uncharted-
journey character, the exhibit provides us a space where we are 
urged to experiment with our own moral convictions from multiple 
perspectives, without foregone conclusion about the degree to 
which these perspectives can be integrated. The scenes on display 
can be mobilized in ways that will make us apprehensive about 
scenes from our everyday life-world (at swimming pools, hair 
salons, coffee houses, libraries, grocery stores, etc.) that we never 
thought could be worrisome or morally weighty at all.  Museum-
visitors qua participants in experimental memorialization might 
leave the exhibit with a cacophony of moral voices in their head.  
In such an epic-theatrical setting, each encounter with a “scene 
from the past” may activate or amplify desires, aversions or other 
emotional capacities we didn’t know we had or needed. Through a 
nearly kaleidoscopic experience, the viewers are compelled to co-
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produce the entire exhibit’s meaning as if they were confronted 
with a mosaic that is not only unfinished, but whose parts keep 
shifting along with the viewers’ own movement as they make their 
way past the different items on display.4  Historical contingencies 
are incorporated into an open-ended museum experience with the 
capacity to enrich our participatory activity as co-producers of 
remembrance; and such enrichment does not entail any teleological 
guarantee for social progress or moral maturation. Instead, 
historical learning refers to a risky process of loosening and 
exposing morally charged background assumptions we had tacitly 
registered. The workings of museum as epic theatre dissociates 
curators from their role of moral teachers and opens up the 
museum encounter as a creative space similar to what Di 
Paolantonio calls “an anachrony in our present.” (Di Paolantonio, 
2010, 8).  Instead of ordering our historical data in a linear fashion 
(positing these scenes as a “past” distant from the present), the 
exhibit encourages us to creatively, if uneasily, mix them up by 
interspersing scenes from the past with scenes from the present 
and/or with an imagined future. Thus Brecht’s notion of epic 
theatre makes visible the historical vicissitudes of our individual 
lives, in ways that shock us out of experiential complacency, but 
also give us time to experiment with our moral profile(s) in the face 
of intersecting scenes. The newly emerging relations that arise out 
of the experimental museum experience can no longer clearly be 
classified as “past” or “present.” Instead, these experiences emerge 
as “anachronistic-in-the-present,” in that they are geared to detect 
political tendencies in presumably apolitical settings.  
Conclusion  
Understanding the museum as epic theatre is not meant to expose 
our covert “micro-fascism,” to borrow the phrase familiar from 
Deleuze and Guattari (Deleuze and Guattari, 1997, 214). The latter 
claim to exposure would re-raise the question about the 
independent normative basis of the moral platform from which this 
general accusation is made. Instead, memorialization modeled on 
epic theatre is animated by a continued effort to scrutinize certain 
                                                    
4 In this regard, my present account of museum as epic theater can be 
read as moving the experience of museums closer to the experience of 
memorials such as Blair et.al.’s work on the Vietnam Memorial in 
Washington D.C., and James E. Young’s “counter-monuments.”  While 
the distinction between memorial and museum must not hastily be 
conflated, there is an affinity between the kind of critical experience that 
museums and memorials can generate, respectively.  See Carole Blair, 
Marsha S. Jepperson, and Enrico Pucci, 1991; Young, 1993.    
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phenomena from a given cultural environment to notice disturbing 
trends where we expect them the least. The immediate challenge is 
not to assess starkly immoral data by using our moral radar, but to 
change the receptive registers of that radar itself. In this sense, 
museum as epic theatre promotes “[a]n unpredictable and non-
compliant approach to remembrance and learning in the museum” 
(Di Paolantonio, 2010, 2). 
Thus Uwe Steiner remarks, “By questioning the conventional 
character of the theatre as entertainment, the epic theater 
invalidates traditional aesthetic standards and at the same time 
threatens the privileged position of professional critics” (Steiner, 
2010, 104.)  In the same way, by questioning the conventional 
approach to museum exhibits as moral education, the notion of epic 
theatre dramatizes the possibility that seeing museums as material 
sites of public address undermines the museums’ potential to revise 
our moral self-perceptions and facilitate historical learning. 
Alternately, the participatory nature of epic theatre points to a new 
understanding of the museum as an interactive laboratory for 
reshaping social experience by acknowledging and incorporating 
contingencies, according to an understanding of historical 
temporality that is as skewed as it is creative. From this point of 
view, the primary challenge of ethical guidance does not so much 
consist in rectifying our perspective on an “obviously immoral” past 
that we must not repeat, but on realizing how seemingly non-moral 
aspects of our everyday life may direct us toward an immoral future 
that is still in the making. In keeping with those passages where 
Gross emphasizes the need for destabilizing the interpretive frames 
in which we habitually organize our ethical experience (as opposed 
to those segments where he seems to opt for a pre-conceived 
integration of moral perspective by the curators for the audience), 
museums need not be sites where moral standards or convictions 
are confirmed or instilled. Rather, they are sites where moral (self-) 
perceptions are “unlearned” or loosened for the sake of social 
change. Thus, reimagining museum as epic theatre allows us to 
evaluate its capacity to destabilize our moral sensibilities in terms 
of enriching, rather than instructing, our future visions.  
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